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     The doctrine of justification has proved to be a sticking point for N. T. 
Wright’s ambitious attempt at a new theology of the New Testament. In 
now at least four monographs, Wright has circled around Paul’s Gospel 
always keeping God’s justifying work in Christ at the center of his 
vision.1 It remains under debate whether or not he has made a successful 
landing. Wright himself clearly is aware of the questions that his 
proposal has raised and in his most recent work gives an answer to those 
who have questioned his interpretation of Paul’s Gospel.2 His rhetoric, as 
∗Dr. Seifrid is the author of Christ, Our Righteousness: Paul's Theology of 
Justification (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2000). 
1 That includes N. T. Wright, The Climax of the Covenant: Christ and the 
Law in Pauline Theology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991/Minneapolis, MN: 
Fortress, 1992); N. T. Wright, What Saint Paul Really Said: Was Paul of Tarsus 
the Real Founder of Christianity? (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1997); N. T. 
Wright, Paul in Fresh Perspective (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2005); 
Justification: God’s Plan and Paul’s Vision (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 
2009). 
2 Wright, Justification: God’s Plan and Paul’s Vision (Downers Grove, IL: 
InterVarsity, 2009). Subsequent page references in this essay correspond to this 
American edition.  Although he addresses various critics along the way, his 
primary response is directed to his primary partner in debate, John Piper (see, 
The Future of Justification: A Response to N. T. Wright  [Wheaton, IL: 
Crossway, 2007]). 
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always, is remarkable. His concern to combat a perverted individualism 
and to promote a healthy, biblical concern for God’s work in this world 
should be welcome to all of us. At the same time, it must be said that a 
reading of Wright’s work reveals equivocations and inconsistencies that 
jeopardize his entire program.3 It is hard to tell whether Wright’s 
rhetorical flourishes, or his commitment to his larger scheme of “Israel’s 
return from exile,” or both prevent him from seeing these problems. To 
raise questions about Wright’s program is to risk appearing as a cranky 
traditionalist who wants to spoil the celebration of a fresh perspective 
with stale dogma. But perhaps, as Jaroslav Pelikan once urged, it may be 
possible to celebrate tradition without falling prey to traditionalism.4
From the fires of the past, we might yet bring the flame and not the ash.5
Wright’s program may be summarized succinctly in his repeated 
claim that “God’s single plan to put the world to rights” is nothing other 
than his “plan to do so through Israel” (p. 65). The formal and material 
dimensions of this proposal stand or fall together. It is only as God acts 
in, for and through Israel that one may speak of a single, saving purpose 
of God.  Likewise, only if God’s plan is simple and unbroken may one 
speak of “Israel” and “Israel” alone as the vehicle of God’s saving 
purpose. Wright’s inconsistencies concerning the identity of Israel and 
the function of the Law call into question his proposal to read Scripture 
as a straight-line narrative.6 We shall have to leave them aside here. Our
3 “Omnis aequivocatio mater errorum,” Luther, WA 39:2, 28,28. 
4 J. Pelikan, The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of 
Doctrine Volume 1: The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (100–600)
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), 9: “Tradition is the living faith of 
the dead; traditionalism is the dead faith of the living.” 
5 The latter dictum is cited by many; I have it from Hugh T. Kerr, 
“Warfield: The Person Behind the Theology,” PSB 25.1 (2004): 93. 
6 As a confession of the oneness of God, Wright’s formal claim that 
Scripture tells of a single plan of God for the salvation of the world (p. 94) is all 
well and good, even if the target of his complaint remains obscure. [If Wright 
has some sort of “Lutheran” view in mind here (as he explicitly indicates at 
various points in his work), he misses his target widely, since “Lutherans” (both 
the confessional ones and at least some of the Westerholm type) will quite 
heartily agree with him. They would merely want to add the caveat that so long 
as we remain on this side of glory we cannot see the whole of the single, divine 
plan. As Paul himself confesses, the oneness of God is presently a matter of faith 
(Rom 3:27-31). The distinction between the present fallen age and the one to 
come turns out to be critical to the assessment of Wright’s work. See also Mark 
A. Seifrid, “Story-Lines of Scripture and Footsteps in the Sea,” SBJT 12.4 
(2008): 96-106.] One may question, however, whether Wright remains true to 
his proposal. According to his reading, the Scriptures tell the story of God 
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putting the world right through his covenant with Israel: “Here we have it: 
God’s single plan, through Abraham and his family, to bless the whole world,”
(p. 67; Wright’s italics). [In his assertion that there is a single covenant of God, 
in which promise and demand are joined, and which was given to Israel for the 
world, and fulfilled in Jesus Christ, Wright stands remarkably close to Barth’s 
mature theology of the covenant—perhaps unconsciously taking it up. For a 
useful summary of the development of Barth’s “covenant theology,” see E. 
Busch, “Der eine Gnadenbund Gottes: Karl Barths neue Föderaltheologie,” 
ThQ 176.4 (1996): 341–54.  Wright differs from Barth in his radical redefinition 
of Israel, on which point his thought clearly parallels that of Oscar Cullmann. 
See O. Cullmann, Christus und die Zeit: Die urchristliche Zeit- und 
Geschichtsauffassung (2d ed.; Zollikon-Zürich: Evangelischer Verlag, 
1948), 104–6.  His equivocation on the identity of Israel that we examine below 
nevertheless exposes weaknesses that are inherent to the work of both Barth and 
Cullmann.] Wright repeatedly argues that Israel was faithless in its calling to be 
a “light to the nations” (Isa 42:6; 49:6). Where Israel failed, Jesus arrived as “the 
faithful Israelite, through whom the single plan can proceed after all,” offering 
obedience to God in his faithfulness to death on the cross (p. 105). Wright 
correspondingly affirms that Jesus died for Israel’s guilt, taking up himself the 
death they deserved (p. 105). It is this concession that throws his claim of a 
straight-line story into question, since if the cross was a substitutionary event, 
one must conclude that God apparently did have a “Plan B” to his saving work 
through Israel (p. 73). The alternative is to say—in an inversion of Caiaphas’ 
judgment—that God intended Israel to be crucified for the sins of the world. 
Wright misses this problem, perhaps because he understands Jesus’ death 
primarily as an act of “representation.” For him the individualistic category of 
“substitution” is a subordinate element of a larger, corporate event.  In rejecting 
what he calls, “the sterile old antithesis between ‘representation’ and 
‘substitution’,” he argues that “the Messiah is able to be the substitute because
he is the representative” (p. 106; Wright’s italics). [In the significance he 
attaches to the “faithful obedience” of the Messiah, Wright comes remarkably 
close to his partner in debate, John Piper (p. 105). Each in his own way regards 
Jesus as a representative, whose “active obedience” in fulfillment of the Law 
(and the divine purpose) constitutes an essential and distinct element of the 
substitutionary effect of his saving death. Admittedly, Wright argues in the 
interest of corporate categories that “imputation” (and therewith “justification”) 
has to do merely with the according of a status as a member of the people of 
God (pp. 90-91). Nevertheless, he recognizes that Jesus bore the death and 
condemnation that belonged to Israel as well as to all of us (pp. 105-106).  
Wright parts ways with Piper in that he understands Jesus’ “active obedience” as 
extending all the way through Jesus’ death, and more importantly, in that he 
denies its “substitutionary” significance. Piper follows the traditional Protestant 
loci, of course, and understands Jesus’ “active obedience” as imputed to the 
believer.] Wright thus recognizes an individual dimension of Jesus’ death, and 
yet circumscribes its role within the drama of salvation. Jesus’ death in place of 
us merely grants us a new status and thus places us within the people of God. 
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What happens within that community constitutes the main event, namely, our 
participation in Jesus’ faithfulness and transformation into the divine image. Yet 
Wright does not do away with the substitutionary dimension of the saving event; 
he only limits it. This moment of individualism, the recognition of Jesus as an 
individual distinct from Israel, undermines his insistence that the Scriptures 
present a single divine plan to bless the world through the nation. 
The corporate conception of “representation” that Wright embraces creates 
its own problems for his urging that the Scriptures present a single story-line.  In 
Wright’s reading, Jesus comes to embody Israel without reserve. Indeed, Jesus’ 
achievement as Messiah effects the redefinition of God’s people. The people of 
God is now the family marked by “faith(fulness),” and not by any ethnic 
boundary-marker (pp. 103-105, 117).  The nation of Israel thus loses its identity. 
Whatever one makes of this redefinition of “Israel,” it introduces discontinuity 
into the story of salvation. [The supersessionism of Wright’s proposal is 
remarkably similar to the kind that Adele Reinhartz finds in Dorothy Sayers: 
“Caiaphas’ Post-Canonical Career,” (paper presented at the 63rd annual meeting 
of the Studiorum Novi Testamenti Societas, Lund, Sweden, 4 August 2008).]
Wright’s privileging of corporate categories likewise introduces confusion 
into his treatment of the law and the question of human guilt.  On the one hand, 
the law served to show that Jews, like the rest of the human race, were sinful, 
because it was impossible to keep it perfectly (p. 118).  [It is strange that Wright 
imagines that Luther had no conception of the goodness of the Law or the usus
politicus, and stranger yet that Wright scolds Luther for saying precisely what 
Wright himself affirms, that the law condemns (p. 72).] Indeed, “Israel under the 
Torah cannot be declared to be God’s people, because the Torah merely points 
to sin” (p. 121). [Wright probably does not mean this statement absolutely 
(which would be quite problematic), since he speaks of Jesus as Israel’s 
representative. Nevertheless, his way of understanding “the people of God” 
anticipates the moralism that is characteristic of his program.] The Law gets in 
the way of the promise to Abraham “by apparently choking the promise within 
the failure of Israel, . . . then finally by locking everything up under the prison 
house of sin” (p. 123; cf. pp. 135, 200). At this juncture, Wright appeals to 
Jesus’ substitutionary death:  for the positive verdict on Israel and the world the 
Messiah’s faithfulness unto death was necessary (p. 121). On the other hand—
following Calvin—Wright argues that the law was given at Sinai as a way of life 
to a people already redeemed, in order to set Israel apart from the nations (pp. 
72-73). Torah included the sacrificial system, through which atonement could be 
made, so that “one did not need or expect to be always perfect in all respects” (p. 
76). Does the law bring guilt or not? The inconsistency in Wright’s two 
opposing assessments has to do with his ambivalence concerning the 
substitutionary dimension of Jesus’ death. As is consistently the case with him, 
the corporate category of representation takes over his interpretation: “The point 
is that Torah must be understood within the strange single-plan-of God-through-
Israel-for-the-world” (p. 129, Wright’s italics) so that through “the Messiah and 
his faithful, saving death” God’s people are now identified by the badge of 
“faith/faithfulness.”  By means of this problematic identification of Jesus and 
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attention will be focused instead on Wright’s understanding of the 
atonement and justification, faith and Christian community into which 
these inconsistencies spill over.
The current attractiveness of Wright’s proposal among evangelicals 
rests in his insistence that salvation primarily has to do with believing 
community. “Justification” for Wright has to do with Israel as the people 
of God, and then through Jesus, with all the nations who join God’s 
people.7 Consequently, “justification” does not have to do with the 
Israel, Wright shifts the question of the law from the sphere of guilt to that of 
salvation-history: “Torah had a purpose all right; it was indeed God’s holy law; 
but its purpose was to keep Israel in check, to stop God’s wayward people going 
totally off track, until the time when, through the Messiah, the long-term 
ultimate promises could be fulfilled” (p. 129). Wright here thinks in terms of the 
Messiah as representative, so that the usus elenchticus that he elsewhere affirms 
disappears, and the usus politicus becomes the sole purpose of the law.  Indeed, 
according to Wright it is an “old caricature” to speak of the law as “driving us to 
despair of accomplishing its demands” and to flee to Christ to find the way of 
faith (pp. 129, 232). The relationship between the law of God and the faith of the 
gospel consequently becomes a mere shift in salvation-history:  life under Torah 
was like living with candles in the dark; now the sun has risen (p. 129).  There is 
no overlooking Wright’s inconsistency here. He must decide whether the law 
had the merely temporary function of restraining the evil within Israel, or if the 
law exposes the guilt within Israel—and the world—with which the cross has 
dealt.  Normally, of course, the usus politicus is not played off against the usus
elenchticus. If, however, one does so, one cannot have it both ways.
7 In some ways Wright stands close to Albrecht Ritschl’s theological 
program both in his tendency toward biblicism and in the priority he gives to the 
corporate dimension of salvation. He shares Ritschl’s preference for Reformed 
theology, and, like Ritschl, makes appeal to the divine covenant as a 
fundamental category for understanding redemption. For Wright as well as for 
Ritschl, the distinction between old and new covenants is that of the particular 
and national versus the universal. Likewise, Jesus serves for Wright as a moral 
ideal in much the same way that Ritschl understood him as an ethical archetype. 
In certain respects Wright remains more committed to Protestant orthodoxy than 
does Ritschl, and thus maintains a distinct place for a substitutionary atonement 
as a satisfaction of divine wrath that is lacking with Ritschl. Nevertheless, much 
like Ritschl he subordinates justification to the effecting of the larger divine 
plan. Both understand justification in the first instance as a communal reality. 
Just as with Ritschl justification comes to the individual only within community, 
with Wright justification establishes the status of the individual within the 
community. Ritschl thinks more consistently in terms of the community of the 
reconciled, and thus leaves questions of individual faith unanswered. Wright 
allows more room for the individual, and thus offers a less consistent program.  
For a summary of Ritschl’s thought see R. Schäfer, Ritschl: Grundlinien eins 
fast verschollenen dogmatischen Systems (BHT 41; Tübingen, Germany: Mohr 
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“imputation of Christ’s righteousness” nor with the new creation of the 
human being, but with being granted a new status, namely, membership 
in the people of God. “Faith” likewise does not in the first instance have 
to do with our standing before God, but is a badge and emblem of 
membership in God’s people, the necessary mark of “covenant renewal” 
and of our participation in the divine image. Consequently, for Wright 
“justification” brings final salvation only through the work of the Spirit 
who transforms us into the divine image manifest in Jesus.8 The outward 
and visible acts of the believing community thereby become not merely 
the showplace of salvation, but its final criterion. Here, as elsewhere in 
his thought, Wright loses from his view the full dimensions of the final 
judgment. This lost horizon of judgment and the subordination of the 
individual to corporate concerns is not uncommon in recent evangelical 
thought. It deserves further reflection.
I. THE ATONEMENT AS REPRESENTATION 
AND SUBTITUTION 
       The priority Wright gives to community has significant entailments 
for his understanding of the atonement that we must consider on our way 
to assessing his proposal concerning justification. In rejecting what he 
calls “the sterile old antithesis between ‘representation’ and 
‘substitution’”, he argues that “the Messiah is able to be the substitute 
because he is the representative” (p. 106; Wright’s italics).9 For Wright, 
Siebeck, 1968). Correspondingly, Wright’s program likewise bears remarkable 
similarity to the Social Gospel in its utilitarian conception of individual faith, its 
image of Jesus as the initiator of the kingdom, and its emphasis on the continuity 
between present righteousness and that of the kingdom to come. See, for 
example, W. Rauschenbusch, A Theology for the Social Gospel (New York: 
Macmillan, 1917), 95–166 and “The Brotherhood of the Kingdom” (1893) in 
Walter Rauschenbusch: Selected Writings (ed. Winthrop S. Hudson; New York: 
Paulist, 1984), 71-94. 
8 Wright, Paul in Fresh Perspective, 108–29. 
9 In the significance he attaches to the “faithful obedience” of the Messiah, 
Wright comes remarkably close to his partner in debate, John Piper (p. 105).  
Each in his own way regards Jesus as a representative, whose “active 
obedience” in fulfillment of the Law (and the divine purpose) constitutes an 
essential and distinct element of the substitutionary effect of his saving death.  
Admittedly, Wright argues in the interest of corporate categories that 
“imputation” (and therewith “justification”) has to do merely with the according 
of a status as a member of the people of God (pp. 90-91). Nevertheless, he 
recognizes that Jesus bore the death and condemnation that belonged to Israel as 
well as to all of us (pp. 105-106). Wright parts ways with Piper in that he 
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then, Jesus’ death is primarily an act of “representation.” “Substitution” 
is a subordinate element of a larger, corporate event. Because Israel 
failed to reflect the faithfulness of its covenant God, and thus to be a 
blessing to the nations (p. 67), God required “a faithful Israelite, through 
whom the single plan can continue after all” (Wright’s italics; p. 105). 
Through his faithful obedience, Jesus “has attained the position of 
sovereignty over creation marked out for human beings from the 
beginning” (p.103). Wright thus speaks of “the achievement of Jesus as 
the crucified Messiah,” (p. 117) and even of Jesus as the “hero” of the 
divine drama (p. 27). 
It is not clear (to me at least) what Wright means when he rejects a 
so-called “sterile, old antithesis” between “representation and 
substitution.” It is clear, however, that in his subordination of 
“substitution” to “representation” Wright effectively reduces the 
atonement to a mere moral transaction. For Wright, Jesus is first and 
foremost a faithful Israelite, indeed, the one faithful Israel, who is able to 
serve as Israel’s substitute only because he has representatively fulfilled 
the divine will. It is entirely appropriate, of course, to understand Jesus’ 
obedience as essential to the atonement, and, indeed, as having been in a 
sense “rewarded” by God (Phil 2:8, 9-11; cf. Heb 5:7-8). In assigning 
priority to Jesus’ “representative” role, however, Wright goes further. As 
“the faithful Israelite,” Jesus does not in the first instance die in place of 
the nation. He embodies it. Israel thus saves itself in Jesus its 
representative, so to speak, before anything may be said to have been 
done in its place. Admittedly, Wright understands Jesus to serve not only 
as Israel’s representative, but also as God’s representative. Jesus’ 
faithfulness is the revelation of God’s faithfulness and of the divine 
image. But this equation does not change the dynamic of the atonement. 
Indeed, Wright so draws God into Jesus’ faithfulness that he nearly 
makes God out to be nothing more than a moral authority who rewards 
Jesus’ heroic performance. The core of Wright’s conception of the 
atonement is, thus, moralistic. Thus, he fails to see the real drama of 
redemption, the exchange of our person with the person of Christ, the 
exchange of sin and righteousness, the exchange of death and life. He 
misses the “great pleasure” of the cross (cf. Johann Georg Hamann)10
understands Jesus’ “active obedience” as extending all the way through Jesus’ 
death, and more importantly, in that he denies its “substitutionary” significance.  
Piper follows the traditional Protestant loci, of course, and understands Jesus’ 
“active obedience” as imputed to the believer. 
10 “Im Kreutz, wie es unsere Religion schon sinnlich und bildlich nennt, 
liegt ein großer Genuß unserer Existenz—und zugleich das wahre Treibwerk 
unserer verborgensten Kräfte” (Johann Georg Hamann, Briefe [7 vols; ed. W. 
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that can be tasted and experienced only where Christ as Savior is not 
displaced by Christ as example, only where “substitution” is not demoted 
by “representation.” 
The ordering of the relationship between “representation” and 
“substitution” which Wright offers implies that these two dimensions of 
God’s atoning work in Christ are distinct and separate. Is it not rather the 
case that the two are interwoven? In a sense, it is fair to say that as a 
human being, Jesus serves as Israel’s substitute only because he is its 
faithful representative. But is it not equally true to say that Jesus is able 
to serve as Israel’s representative, only because he has come as its 
substitute?  Paul, thus, instructs the Galatians: “When the fullness of time 
had come, God sent forth his Son, coming to be (born) of a woman, 
coming to be under the Law” (Gal 4:4). The preexistent Son has entered 
into the world and into his kinship with Israel, as the root of Jesse and the 
new David. His incarnation, death, and resurrection mark a fresh 
beginning. A substitution and exchange has taken place within the fallen 
world. The Son has taken our place. As the Son who comes as God and 
Lord, Jesus is Israel’s representative only as its substitute. 
“Representation” and “substitution” are not separate, but interwoven 
dimensions of the atonement. Paul, thus, describes Christ’s work in such 
a way that “representation” and “substitution” meet: “Don’t you know 
that as many as have been baptized into Christ Jesus, have been baptized 
into his death?” (Rom 6:3; cf. Eph 2:11-18; Col 2:6-15). In one respect, 
the redeemed are present in the saving event.  In this sense we may 
describe that event as “representative,” or, more precisely, as an event of 
“inclusive representation.” In another respect, those who are redeemed 
were not present in the saving event.  In that sense, then we may describe 
the event as “substitutionary.” We understand God’s saving work in 
Christ properly only as we see that these two dimensions of that work 
interpenetrate and qualify one another. Once “representation” is 
separated from “substitution,” it becomes nothing more than “solidarity,” 
or perhaps, as with Grotius, an exemplary act. As we have seen, Wright 
in his own way understands Jesus’ death, or rather Jesus’ obedience in 
the face of death, primarily as a moral example, even if he retains the 
traditional Protestant understanding of the atonement in of its 
substitutionary dimension.11 Over against Wright’s subordination of 
Ziesemer and A. Henkel; Wiesbaden, Germany: Insel Verlag, 1955–79], 
4:391.16–19.): “In the cross, as our religion sensually and pictorially calls it, lies 
a great pleasure of our existence—and at the same time the true movement of 
our most hidden powers.” 
11 We should note that the same considerations apply to a conception of 
“substitution” that is stripped of any representative dimension. Once isolated in 
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“substitution” to “representation,” then, “representation” and 
“substitution” are to be understood as inseparable, interpenetrating 
aspects of Jesus’ cross and resurrection. In one sense, we were there 
when “they crucified (our) Lord,” in another sense we were not.
We also must not overlook that both the representative and 
substitutionary dimensions of the atonement extend beyond Jesus’ cross 
to his resurrection. Romans 6, to which we already have referred, makes 
it clear that those who have been baptized into Christ’s death also share 
in his resurrected life: “just as he was raised from the dead through the 
glory of the Father, so also we walk in newness of life” (Rom 6:4b). To 
be included and to share in Christ’s death is to be included and to share 
in the new life of obedience and the hope of the resurrection, that is, to 
share in Christ’s resurrection communicated to us by faith (Rom 6:5-11). 
It is not only Christ’s death that was an event of “inclusive 
representation,” but also his resurrection. Christ stood in our place in his 
death so that we might stand in his place in the life of the new creation. 
Because of the priority Wright assigns to “representation,” he has 
difficulty in taking into account this participation in Jesus’ saving 
resurrection. The bare nail on the cover of the American edition of 
Wright’s recent work betrays its thrust: his attention is focused on Jesus’ 
obedience to death.12 He has given extensive attention elsewhere, of 
course, to the resurrection of the Son of God. Even in this work, 
however, his understanding of salvation is tilted toward Jesus’ 
obedience, so that he does not appreciate the full significance of Jesus’ 
resurrection. His discussion there of Romans 6:1-11 is instructive.13 He 
quite rightly understands Paul to refer to the future resurrection of 
believers in vv. 5 and 8: “if we have died with Christ, we believe that we 
shall also live with him” (Rom 6:8). As he indicates, the new obedience 
of the Christian of which Paul speaks, our “walking in the newness of 
life” (Rom 6:4), implies a “metaphorical resurrection,” or more properly 
this way, “substitution” becomes nothing more than an act of “replacement.”  
One ends up with a bare Anselmian understanding that leaves the 
communication of the saving benefits of God’s atoning work in Christ 
unexplained.  See Stephan Schaede, Stellvertretung: Begriffsgeschichtliche 
Studien zur Soteriologie (BHT 126; Tübingen, Germany: Mohr Siebeck, 
2004), 625–41, esp. 629–30. 
12 One of Caravaggio’s paintings of Paul’s conversion appears on the cover 
of the UK edition. Here Wright’s idealistic conception of a transforming vision 
comes to expression. Despite the obvious reference to Jesus’ resurrection, the 
implicit theology of the cover remains the same, as does, of course, the content 
of the book itself. 
13 N. T. Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God (Christian Origins and 
the Question of God 3; Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2003), 251–4. 
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stated, Jesus’ resurrection in metaphor. For Wright, this “walking in 
newness of life” is a continuation of the “exodus” theme: just as Israel 
was freed from slavery in Egypt and led into the promised land, our 
underlying status is freedom from sin and our ultimate destination is the 
life of the age to come. While the appeal to the pattern of the exodus is 
not entirely wrong, Wright’s focus on Jesus’ obedience as a model for 
our own leads him to underestimate our share in Jesus’ resurrection. At 
least three observations are in order. First, although Paul’s language 
implies that our present participation in Jesus’ resurrection is to be 
understood metaphorically, Paul does not, in fact, employ metaphor, but 
uses direct speech that makes the comparison explicit: “In order that, just
as Christ was raised from the dead through the glory of the Father, so we, 
too, might walk in newness of life” (Rom 6:4). Second, in this direct 
speech the similitude or likeness that grounds the potential metaphor 
becomes clear. Our new obedience corresponds to the resurrection of 
Christ in that “the glory of the Father” manifest in Christ’s resurrection 
and “the newness of life” that is given to us are implicitly equivalent. It 
quickly becomes apparent from a scan of Pauline usage that these 
expressions signify the effecting of the new creation and its presence, 
respectively.14 One is led, therefore, to the striking and profound 
conclusion that Paul’s metaphorical transfer of meaning from Christ’s 
resurrection to our new obedience is based on the transfer of the reality
of Christ’s resurrection here and now to those who believe.15 Our new 
obedience is nothing other than the resurrection in transferred form. This 
“transferred resurrection” comes to full metaphorical expression in 
Colossians and Ephesians: we have been raised with Christ and seated 
with him “in the heavenlies.”16 Indeed, it is the realistic metaphor, the 
14 On “glory” see:  Rom 5:2; 8:18, 21; 9:23; on “newness” see:  Rom 7:6; 2 
Cor 5:17; Gal 6:15.  
15 See Joachim Ringleben, “Luther zur Metapher,” ZTK 94.3 (1997): 336–
369; “Metapher und Eschatologie bei Luther,” ZTK 100.2 (2003):  223–240.  
Luther speaks significantly in respect to 2 Cor 5:21 of Christ being made 
metaphorically into sin (“Christus . . . factus est peccatum metaphorice”), on 
which see Gerhard Ebeling, “Christus . . . factus est peccatum metaphorice,” in 
Wort und Glaube, Band 4: Theologie in den Gegensätzen des Lebens (Tübingen, 
Germany: Mohr Siebeck, 1995), 583-609. 
16 See Col 2:12-13; 3:1; Eph 2:5-6. Wright himself momentarily recognizes 
the import of these verses, but then quickly slips into his salvation-historical 
scheme in which the “transferred” resurrection loses its real weight: “Without 
downplaying the future hope of actual resurrection itself, the fact that the church 
lives in the interval between the Messiah’s resurrection and its own ultimate new 
life means that the metaphorical use of ‘resurrection’ language can be adapted to 
denote the concrete Christian living described in 2.10.” Wright, The
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transfer of the reality of the new creation into our life in the present order 
that guards against a totalistic metaphor that would suppose that our life 
in the present order is resurrection life. Paul’s metaphorical realism 
guards against the Corinthian error that we encounter again in the 
Pastoral Epistles, the subsuming of the resurrection life into the present 
age (1 Cor 15:12-19; 2 Tim 2:18-19; cf. 2 Thess 2:2). It is not clear that 
Wright’s symbolic appropriation of the Pauline metaphor sufficiently 
guards against such a totalizing approach: “building for the kingdom” 
may well displace the hope of the kingdom breaking in upon this world. 
For Paul, baptized believers in Christ live in the intersection of the times. 
We make progress and enter the promised land of resurrection life only 
because in Jesus Christ we already share in that resurrection life here and 
now. Third, Wright’s loss of perspective stands out all the more sharply 
in his treatment of Paul’s statements about our death. In contrast with his 
discussion of Jesus’ resurrection, he leaves this language unexplored and 
effectively treats it as direct speech. Consequently, for Wright believers 
in a certain sense live in an “intermediate state,” dead to sin but not yet 
literally raised from the dead. Quite right, of course. But Paul’s realistic 
metaphor goes missing.  Christian obedience is no intermediate state and 
is far deeper and greater than new behavior.17 The difference between 
Wright’s handling of Christ’s death and Christ’s resurrection is 
remarkable in that while Paul employs more or less direct speech to 
describe our participation in Christ’s resurrection, he uses full-blown 
metaphor to describe our participation in Christ’s death: “we were 
baptized into his death; we were buried with him, through baptism into 
death; we have been planted together with the likeness of his death; our 
old person has been crucified with him; we have died with Christ” (Rom 
6:4, 5, 6, 8). Our reckoning of ourselves as dead to sin does not differ 
from our reckoning ourselves alive to God in Christ. Paul’s language 
shares in metaphor in both instances. In both instances, however, he 
speaks of real participation here and now in Christ, both in Christ’s 
resurrection as well as in Christ’s death. Jesus’ resurrection is much more 
than a goal to which we are to be conformed. It is also a reality in which 
we already share: “If anyone is in Christ, there is a new creation. The old 
things have passed away. Behold, the new has come!” (2 Cor 5:17). Only 
those who in the present life possess the life of the resurrection shall 
enter into the life of the resurrection at the coming of the Lord. The 
reality of the new creation in which we share in Christ goes missing in 
Wright’s work, because Wright understands Jesus first and foremost as 
Israel’s representative. 
Resurrection, 237; see also 236–40. 
17 Wright, The Resurrection, 251–3.
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Wright has difficulty not only in accounting for Jesus’ resurrection, 
but also for his death. This is not the only remarkable irony about 
Wright’s scheme, as we shall see! In his representative role, within the 
larger divine plan, Jesus loses his individual identity and becomes 
generic. Wright’s Jesus, thus, cannot utter the cry of dereliction, “My
God, my God, why have you forsaken me?” since he represents the entire 
nation and fulfills “the-single-plan-of-God” of which he is fully aware.18
In this way, contrary to Wright’s own intent and concern, he de-
historicizes Jesus. His elevation of Jesus’ representative role makes Jesus 
into an image and model of obedience. It is at this point, again, that 
Wright fails to capture the true dynamic of salvation. Our salvation goes 
beyond what Jesus did in obedience to the will of God. It includes what 
Jesus suffered.19 It is not merely Jesus’ obedience unto death that saves 
us, but his very death itself. “He was crucified on account of weakness,
but lives by the power of God” (2 Cor 13:4). Jesus saves as the Crucified 
One who lives, not merely as the Obedient One who was vindicated.
In depersonalizing Jesus, not only does Wright miss the depths of 
Jesus’ suffering, he also—again, ironically—misses the heights of New 
Testament Christology, despite his admirable concern with it. In a way 
that transcends Wright’s proposal, Jesus appears in the New Testament 
not merely as the Suffering Servant who fulfills the divine purpose, but 
also as the one human being who acts as God.20 That is already clear in 
the Markan ransom saying, according to which the Son of Man acts 
freely out of love and with the power to redeem, apart from any reference 
to the Father: “the Son of Man gives his life as a ransom for many”
(Mark 10:45; Matt 20:28). Likewise, according to the Johannine witness, 
Jesus lays down his life of his own accord. No one takes it from him. The
commandment he has received from the Father paradoxically rests in his 
own authority to lay down his life and take it up again (John 10:17-18). 
18 Wright subsumes the cry of dereliction under Jesus’ vocation: the 
kingdom comes through the suffering of the righteous. Jesus’ suffering thus 
becomes generic—and the cry of dereliction is explained away. See N. T. 
Wright, Jesus and the Victory of God (Christian Origins and the Question of 
God 2; Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1996), 600–1. 
19 Karl Friedrich Ulrichs rightly underscores this matter in reference to the 
debate over the meaning of “the faith of Christ.” See K. F. Ulrichs, 
Christusglaube: Studien zum Syntagma pistis Christou und zum paulinischen 
Verständnis von Glaube und Rechtfertigung (WUNT 2/227; Tübingen, 
Germany: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), 6, 193. 
20 Paul’s identification of Jesus as God is diminished in Wright’s 
Christology of the divine image, according to which the human Jesus displays 
the divine character. One might perhaps describe this tendency as Eutychian. 
See Seifrid, “Story-Lines of Scripture,” 97. 
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In Romans 5, Paul speaks not only of the obedience of Christ (Rom 
5:19), but also, and in the first place, of the “gift by the grace of the one 
human being, Jesus Christ,” a gift and grace that is equivalent to the 
grace of God (Rom 5:15).21 Jesus suffers not merely as an obedient 
human being fulfilling the divine will, but as very God, who gives 
himself for us and, thus, saves us. Christ’s triumph is that of his own all-
conquering love, a love that is nothing other than the love of God itself 
(Rom 8:39). The atonement is something larger than a moral 
accomplishment or transaction. It is Christ’s own defeat of sin and death: 
“it was for this purpose that Christ died and lived again, that he might 
rule as Lord, both over the dead as well as over the living” (Rom 14:9; 
cf. 2 Cor 5:14-15). 
Wright’s interpretation of the atonement primarily in terms of Jesus’ 
role as Israel’s representative, thus, not only obscures its substitutionary 
dimension, it obscures the exchange of persons that is at the heart of that 
substitutionary understanding. The message of the New Testament is not 
merely that God has done something for us in Jesus. It is that in Jesus 
Christ God himself has exchanged places with us, taking our persons, our 
sin, our death, our judgment upon himself and giving himself to us so 
that we might have his righteousness and life. Paul, thus, summarizes 
Christ’s saving work in profoundly personal terms when he speaks of the 
life he lives as that of “the son of God, who loved me and gave himself 
up for me” (Gal 2:20). Wright’s commitment to the priority of corporate 
categories leads him, in stark contrast, to a moralistic—and, indeed, 
rationalistic—conception of the atonement. 
II. JUSTIFICATION IN LIMITED PERSPECTIVE 
       Wright’s loss of perspective on our full participation in Christ and 
his resurrection limits his perspective on God’s justifying work in Jesus. 
On the one hand, Wright rightly understands Jesus’ resurrection as, “the 
‘vindication’ of Jesus, his ‘justification’ after the apparent [sic]
condemnation of the court that sent him to his death” (p. 106). He, thus, 
21 The same idea appears regularly in the Pauline prescripts, e.g.  “grace and 
peace to you, from God our Father and the Lord Jesus Christ” (Rom 1:7). In the 
“grace-wish” of Galatians, Paul names Christ along with the Father as the source 
of grace and describes him as the one, “who gave himself for our sins, that he 
might redeem us from the present evil age” (Gal 1:4). Christ’s death is not 
merely an act of obedience toward God.  It is simultaneously a free act of love 
toward us. On this theme, see Wiard Popkes, Christus traditus: Eine 
Untersuchung zum Begriff der Dahingabe im Neuen Testament (ATANT 49; 
Zürich, Germany: Zwingli Verlag, 1967), 271–95. 
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acknowledges the effective character of God’s justifying pronouncement. 
On the other hand—at least in his most recent work—Wright follows a 
strict and narrow ordo salutis within which our justification “denotes one
specific aspect of or moment within” the sequence of thought having to 
do with salvation by grace (p. 87, Wright’s italics).22 He, thus, insists that 
our justification is nothing more than “the status that someone has when 
the court has found in their favor” (p. 90). Not even his appropriation of 
Austin’s “speech-act” theory sways him from this judgment: as a 
“speech-act” the decision of the judge creates nothing more than a new 
status of membership within the people of God (p. 69). Although it is 
difficult to tell, given the shifting sands of Wright’s thought, this 
characterization of “justification” appears to mark a significant change 
over against his earlier insistence that “justification” is a mere 
declaration about the faith that God finds in his people: that declaration 
would constitute a “constative” utterance, not a “performative” one in 
Austin’s terms.23 In any case, the status given in the divine declaration is 
not the status of the judge, who does not transfer his righteousness to the 
defendant by imputation, nor in any other way (pp. 66-69). Even if 
consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, one wonders how this rigid 
interpretation of justification can be squared with Wright’s proper 
insistence elsewhere that the justification and righteousness for which the 
people of God hope is their final vindication.24 In fact, in his discussion 
of 1 Cor 1:30, Wright joins Paul in celebrating the risen and vindicated 
Christ as our righteousness, and indeed, as our final vindication (pp. 155-
157). Wright is able to equivocate on this matter, because he regards the 
initial status given in justification as the gift of forgiveness and of the 
Spirit, and, thus, is happy to speak of this initial justification as 
“vindication” (p. 90).25 Now, however, there are two “vindications”: the 
initial vindication that sets us within the people of God and a final 
vindication in the resurrection to life eternal. Wright insists on limiting 
the language of justification to our initial “status” and reserves the 
references to our sharing in God’s righteousness to the progress and 
consummation of our salvation (68-71).26 The link between the two for 
Wright is the sure and certain work of the Spirit who transforms us (188-
189). His thought is, thus, nicely Augustinian and Tridentine, despite his 
22 Wright himself suggests that “this [understanding of ‘righteousness’] is 
something that no good Lutheran or Reformed theologian ought ever to object 
to” (p. 90).
23 See, e.g., Wright, Paul in Fresh Perspective, 159–60. 
24 Wright, What Saint Paul Really Said, 98–9, 131. 
25 See also, e.g., Wright, What Saint Paul Really Said, 98–9.
26 Ibid. 
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attempts to distance himself from this theology. An initial vindication 
and a final vindication hardly differ from initial and final justification, 
even if Wright varies his language. The “status” of believers in the 
people of God is likewise drawn into this equivocation, since it is no 
longer clear if their standing within the people of God consists purely 
and entirely in the forgiveness of sins or if it includes their transformed 
life. Indeed, Wright elsewhere tilts toward the latter, arguing that 
“justification” is not about becoming a Christian, but about God’s 
recognition of true human beings, in whose heart the Spirit is at work.27
Wright, thus, drives a wedge between Jesus and us: we can no longer 
have him in an unqualified way here and now as our righteousness. We 
must be transformed into his image in order to share in salvation. How 
much transformation is enough? 
The driving force behind Wright’s distinction between the risen 
Christ and our justification lies again in Wright’s subordination of 
“substitution” to “representation” in the atonement. As we have noted, 
Wright is able to speak of justification in traditional terms: “ . . . in 
Romans 3, Paul’s point is that the whole human race is in the dock, 
guilty before God” (p. 90). Correspondingly, “justification” has to do 
with “acquittal” and “forgiveness” (p. 90). The human being stands, so to 
speak, in the divine “lawcourt.” Justification takes place coram Deo.
Quite right. When, however, Wright treats Paul’s confrontation of 
Cephas in Galatians 2:11-21, we are no longer in a “lawcourt,” but at a 
dinner table. Here “justification” does not mean “to be granted free 
forgiveness of your sins.” It means instead, “to be reckoned by God to be 
a true member of his family, and hence with the right to share in table 
fellowship” (p. 116). There is nothing wrong, of course, with arguing—
as, in fact, Paul does—that no one can be justified by “works of the law,” 
both because the law brings guilt and because the one God saves both 
Jews and Gentiles (Rom 3:19-20, 27-21). Nor is it wrong to give 
attention to the details of the text, even if Wright’s dissonant readings of 
Galatians and Romans strain credulity. Wright goes further, however, 
and plays off membership within the people of God against forgiveness 
and acquittal. Precisely what is our standing within the people of God, if 
it is not participation in the community of forgiven sinners? Wright 
speaks of “being reckoned a true member of the family” in terms of 
“faithful membership” (emphasis mine) in “the Christian family” (p. 
116). This status in the “Messiah-redefined family” appears to be 
27 See the discussion below and Mark A. Seifrid, “The Narrative of 
Scripture and Justification by Faith: A Fresh Response to N. T. Wright,” 
CTQ 72.1 (2008): 38–40. 
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something more than being forgiven and acquitted (p. 117).28 Is it 
contingent upon the faithfulness and true humanity effected within us by 
the Spirit?29 The answer appears to be, “Yes.” For Wright, as we have 
seen, justification is God’s acknowledgement of those who belong to the 
covenant community, the granting of a status within the people of God. 
That status is marked by “faith,” or more properly, by the “faithfulness” 
which is present prior to any justifying judgment.30 As a mere “finding of 
the facts,” justification is contingent upon a prior work of God’s grace in 
us. Our justification at the final judgment is no different. On this point, 
Wright appeals to Calvin’s beneficia duplex—justification and 
sanctification—that are given within the larger reality of union with 
Christ (p. 85). As we have seen already, however, Wright, quite unlike 
Calvin, limits the significance of justification to the status initially
granted to the believer within the community and correspondingly 
expands “sanctification” so that it becomes the decisive element of union 
with Christ. What God said and did for us in Jesus is not a single, 
undivided reality in which we participate. For Wright, it is parceled out 
into a declaration of status that is followed by an “actual rescue” (p. 
170). We must become “in reality” what we already are “by declaration.” 
(p. 106). Wright thus strangely embraces a fictional understanding of 
justification, the caricature that is often attributed to Protestant theology. 
In so doing, he again creates problems for his own understanding of 
justification. Does not justification, according to Wright himself, mark 
out those who share in the faith(fulness) of the Messiah?31 How, on 
Wright’s reading, can we be declared to be something that in reality we 
are not?32 We must leave it to Wright to sort out this inconsistency. In his 
view, in any case, the Spirit enables us to freely choose to become what 
is pleasing to God, and reflect God’s image as it is seen in Jesus, as we 
look away from ourselves to the faithful Messiah (and to the Spirit as 
well, as we shall see). In this way, we become fit to stand at the final 
28 For Wright, “membership in the covenant” means being a “forgiven 
sinner,” but that “only among other things.” See Wright, Paul in Fresh, 121.  
These “other things” apparently are not aspects of forgiveness, but distinctly 
“other” than forgiveness. 
29 Wright’s urging that the problem of sin and that of judgment—as 
manifest in the divine dispersion of humanity at Babel—“sit comfortably side-
by-side” does nothing to resolve this question (p. 118). 
30 Wright, Paul in Fresh Perspective, 117–25, 159–160; What Saint Paul 
Really Said, 113–31. 
31 Wright, Paul in Fresh Perspective, 122. 
32 Is it, perhaps, that Wright is an unwitting member of the school of Karl 
Holl and understands justification in terms of God’s foreknowledge of the work 
he intends to perform in his people? 
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judgment (pp. 144, 149, 156, 226, 239). As Wright repeatedly insists, his 
conception of salvation is not Pelagian. It is Augustinian through and 
through.33 Fair enough. But the question remains as to whether it is 
biblical. It is certainly not reformational.34
Wright’s position becomes even more difficult when he comes to 2 
Cor 5:21: “[God] made the one who knew no sin to be sin on our behalf, 
in order that we might become the righteousness of God in him.” Here, 
as elsewhere, Wright understands “God’s righteousness” as “God’s 
covenant-faithfulness,” expressed in God’s action of reconciling the 
world to himself. Despite the obviously universal dimensions of the 
saving event, Wright understands Paul to speak here of himself and other 
apostles. It is Paul, not the Corinthians, who embodies the righteousness 
of God, a righteousness manifest in what Paul does as Christ’s 
ambassador (pp. 162-165). Wright, thus, understands “God’s 
righteousness” in moral terms and transfers the force of “our becoming 
the righteousness of God” entirely to the apostle (cf. 2 Cor 5:19-20). Paul 
supposedly speaks here of the representative faithfulness of Jesus that he 
embodies and which is finally to be embodied in the Corinthians. 
Several observations are in order. In the first place, it is clear from 
the context that the scope of the atoning event is universal: “if anyone is 
in Christ, there is a new creation” (2 Cor 5:17). Paul makes it clear that 
his apostolic ministry is nothing other than a giving forth of that which 
he has received, namely his reconciliation to God through Christ. Only in 
this way does he act as an ambassador of Christ. When, therefore, he 
speaks of God’s atoning work in Christ, he does not merely refer to 
himself, but also to the Corinthians, to whom he immediately appeals out 
of the atoning event: “And working together [with God, who acted in the 
saving exchange in Christ] we, too, urge you not to receive the grace of 
God in vain” (2 Cor 6:1).35 The reconciling word of the apostle is 
nothing other than the reconciling work of God accomplished in the 
saving exchange in Christ. Paul works together with God in that God 
makes appeal through the apostle who announces this work to the 
Corinthians.36 That work of God in Christ is effective and complete: “If 
33 Of course, medieval theology sought and found ways to circumvent the 
implications of Augustinian anthropology and to introduce the contribution of 
the human being. Wright likewise seems to have found his own way of doing so. 
34 It can be little wonder, then, that his proposal has met with such alarm 
and has provoked such a strong response from John Piper! 
35 The little particle de in 2 Cor 6:1 links what Paul says there to what 
precedes.
36 The adverbial kai following the conjunction įİ marks out 2 Cor 5:21 as 
spoken in reference to the Corinthians: Synergountes de kai parakaloumen mƝ
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one died for all, all died” (2 Cor 5:14); “If anyone is in Christ, there is a 
new creation” (2 Cor 5:17); “God was in Christ, reconciling the world to 
himself” (2 Cor 5:19). Just as God’s making Christ to be sin was not a 
process but an event, so our being made the righteousness of God is not a 
process but an event that has taken place in Christ. The text speaks of a 
dramatic substitution, an exchange of persons in the cross and 
resurrection in which Christ was made what we are. Wright misses this 
exchange of persons and its effective character. He instead understands 
Christ as a visible representation of God’s righteousness that morally 
transforms the apostle and keeps God’s righteousness entirely separate 
from justification. What God has given as an unqualified gift in Christ, 
Wright would like to attain by the power of the Spirit. 
Here the individualism inherent to God’s work in the crucified and 
risen Jesus that Wright attempts to drive out reenters his reading 
unnoticed through a back door in corrupt form. All the justified members 
of the people of God embody God’s righteousness and faithfulness, but 
some, like the apostle, embody that faithfulness more than others (pp. 
166-167). This embodiment of God’s faithfulness, moreover, constitutes 
for Wright what it means to be “truly human” (p. 209).37 The conclusion 
then lies at hand: all of us are human, but some of us are more human 
than others. We shall consider this highly problematic individualism in 
the second essay. 
It becomes apparent, then, in Wright’s wrestling with 2 Cor 5:21 that 
he overlooks essential elements of the justifying event. The problem lies 
in his description of “the lawcourt,” according to which God appears as 
the judge who finds the facts of the case before him in an impartial 
verdict (pp. 68-71). As the term “lawcourt” already suggests, the scene 
Wright imagines presupposes the division of powers of a modern 
democracy.38 In the biblical contexts that provide the relevant 
background to the language of justification, the pronouncement of the 
judge and its effect were fully connected. To rule is to judge, and to 
judge is to establish one’s rule: one “does judgment” (asah mishpat).
Thus, Israel’s shophetim appear in the biblical texts as those whom the 
Lord raised up to deliver Israel from its enemies (e.g. Judg 2:16–18).  
The same dynamic is apparent in the summary of David’s rule: “David 
eis kenon tƝn charin tou theou dexasthai hymas (2 Cor 6:1). 
37 See also Wright, Paul in Fresh Perspective, 109, 124. 
38 Even in this setting, however, the pronouncement of the judge effects the 
verdict, at least in criminal cases. In his analysis of speech-acts, Austin 
recognizes this performative dimension of judgment. See J. L. Austin, How to 
Do Things with Words. (William James Lectures; Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1962), 152–3. 
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ruled as king over Israel; David executed justice and righteousness for all 
the people” (2 Sam 8:15).39 Within the contexts of the Hebrew 
Scriptures, the judgment of priests, elders, or the pater familias involved 
a similar joining of judicial and executive powers.40 In the Roman period, 
rulers, governors, and magistrates likewise bore not only judicial but also 
executive authority.41 The New Testament image of the final judgment 
takes a corresponding form. The Son of Man shall come as king, not 
merely to make a declaration of status, but to pronounce a verdict and, 
thus, to effect it: “Come . . . inherit the kingdom” and, conversely, 
“Depart from me . . . into the eternal fire” (Matt 25:34, 41). According to 
Paul, we must appear before the bƝma of Christ, not merely to hear a 
verdict, but to be recompensed for the things done in the body (2 Cor 
5:10).
Correspondingly, while those who judged in Israel are enjoined to 
strict impartiality with regard to persons, they are called to passionate 
intervention on behalf of the oppressed: “Learn to do good; seek justice; 
set matters right for the oppressed; judge for the orphan, contend for the 
widow” (Isa 1:17; cf. Deut 10:18; Ps 68:5). The judge is to take the part 
of those who have been defrauded of their rights, to enter into contention 
on their behalf. Jesus’ parable of the importunate widow expresses the 
biblical expectation, including its effective dimension. She appeals to the 
judge, “Give me vengeance against my opponent!” (Luke 18:3). Jesus 
promises in the parable that God is ready to take the part of all his 
oppressed children who cry out to him at the coming of the Son of Man. 
Indeed, in the past God already entered into contention with his people 
Israel who themselves oppressed the weak in their midst. The same has 
taken place in Jesus Christ, who became the object of our murderous lies 
and violence (Rom 3:10-18; cf. John 7:7; 15:24-25). Here our unbelief, 
disobedience, and idolatry, already announced by Scripture, are laid bare: 
the fallen human being and God are in a deadly contention. The question 
of God’s faithfulness is not that of a Leibnizian theodicy, that is, one in 
39 Absalom stirred up his insurrection by promising to effect the justice that 
had been neglected by his father (2 Sam 15:1-6). Solomon’s famous judgment 
likewise was predicated upon his executive authority (1 Kgs 3:16-22). 
40 Not to be overlooked here, either, is the legislative authority of the 
judges, and especially of the Davidic kings: they “legislated from the bench” 
creating fresh law by their decisions (see Keith W. Whitelam, The Just King: 
Monarchial Judicial Authority in Ancient Israel [JSOTSup 12; Sheffield, UK: 
JSOT Press, 1979]). Righteousness had to be established ever anew in the face 
of continuing injustices and disputes: the promise of God’s righteousness, 
fulfilled in Jesus Christ, may be understood as the final and definitive bringing 
of justice to the world. 
41 See G Thür and P. E. Pieler, “Gerichtsbarkeit,” RAC 10.368-401. 
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which God is made to stand before the forum of human reason.42 The 
question is rather that of whose word is true and shall triumph. Is it the 
word of a human being, who in the refusal to give thanks to the Creator 
creates idols and so claims to be wise? Or is it the word of God, which 
tells us the truth about our idolatry? In this conflict of judgments, the 
apostle is certain that God, and not the human being, shall triumph: “Let 
God be true, and every human being a liar” (Rom 3:4; Ps 51:6).43 By the 
wonder of God’s grace, this deadly confrontation brings us life in Jesus 
Christ.
The justification of God—the revelation of God’s righteousness—
turns out to be our justification by the communication of God’s 
righteousness to us in Jesus Christ. It is this “wonderful exchange” 
between God and the human being in Christ in 2 Cor 5:21 that Wright 
overlooks. In his incarnation and cross, Christ became what we are and,
thus, came to embody sin (so deep is the reach of sin) in order that in his 
resurrection we might become the righteousness of God (so radical is 
salvation). Paul does not speak here of mere conformity to a moral ideal, 
but of our participation in the life of the resurrection, the new creation 
that has begun already here and now (2 Cor 5:17). God’s righteousness 
itself appears here in the human creature, namely, in the resurrected 
Christ (2 Cor 5:21). In Christ, God comes to be righteous, not, of course, 
in himself, but in us and in the world. We, thus, “become the 
righteousness of God”—not in ourselves, but in Christ, in whom we 
share (2 Cor 5:14-19). Christ is the one meeting place, the mercy-seat, 
where the righteous God and the fallen human being meet. The forensic 
dimension of the event and all that one might say about “imputation” 
become apparent here. As the wonder of God’s grace, this 
communication of God’s righteousness to the human being does not fit 
into the scene of any human “lawcourt,” and certainly not the one that 
Wright imagines. 
The same divine triumph appears in the suffering and deliverance of 
the Isaianic Servant, a pattern to which Paul makes appeal in the context 
42 A recent monograph fatally misconstrues theodicy in this way: J. R. 
Daniel Kirk, Unlocking Romans Resurrection and the Justification of God
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2008). 
43 Wright recognizes the lawsuit between God and Israel (pp. 63-67) and yet 
not that with the nations—since in his view “God’s righteousness” must be 
limited to a covenantal relation—and the covenant exists only with Israel. 
Perhaps for this reason, the conflict between God and the world—God’s wrath 
in its understandable form—plays no role in Wright’s conception of 
justification. 
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of 2 Cor 5:21.44 As is the case with Paul, the Lord appears in these 
contexts not as an impartial arbitrator, but as party to a conflict with the 
nations, with their idols, and with disobedient, unbelieving Israel.45
Despite his contention with his people, the Lord’s final message is one of 
comfort: he contends for his people against their oppressors and in so 
doing, contends against the idols.46 The salvation which the Lord brings 
his people is judgment. The Lord’s judgment is the salvation of his 
people: “Those who contend with you shall be as nothing and perish—
you shall seek them and you will not find them . . . for I am the Lord 
your God who takes hold of your right hand” (Isa 41:12-13). The Isaianic 
language echoes the appeals of the psalmists for the Lord to contend for 
them,47 and corresponds to the call upon those who rule and judge in 
Israel “to do justice” for the oppressed.48 Here again, to triumph in 
judgment is not merely to secure a verdict but to see that verdict effected. 
Correspondingly, with Paul, “justification” is a forensic act that effects 
the new creation. The idea of “justification” as a mere pronouncement of 
status that Wright offers does not match biblical thought (pp. 68-70).49
As the larger context of 2 Cor 5:21 makes clear, the communication 
of God’s righteousness is also the communication of God’s glory to the 
fallen human being in Jesus (cf. 2 Cor 3:4-18). Here we touch on a 
debate between Wright and Piper, and, more significantly, on Wright’s 
pivotal claim that God intended Israel to be a “light to the nations” (Isa 
42:6; 49:6). The question here is that of whether and how the human 
being participates in the divine glory. Wright rejects Piper’s definition of 
God’s righteousness as “God’s concern for God’s own glory,” which, as 
Wright correctly observes, suggests a God concerned for nothing but 
himself.50  The righteousness  of God  instead  expresses “God’s concern 
44 See 2 Cor 5:17; 6:1-2;  cf. Isa 42:1-4; 49:1-6; 50:4-11; 52:13-53:12. 
45 Isa 43:22-28; 48:1-12; 50:1-11. 
46 Isa 40:1-2; 41:8-13, 21-24, 25-29; 43:8-13; 44:6-8; 45:8-25; 54:1-17. 
47 E.g. Ps 7:6-11; 35:1-28; 43:1-5; 54:1-7. 
48 E.g. Judg 4:4-5; 2 Sam 8:15; Ps 72:1-4; Jer 22:3, 15-16. 
49 For further discussion see Mark A. Seifrid, “Paul’s Use of Righteousness 
Language Against Its Hellenistic Background,” Justification and Variegated 
Nomism: Volume 2, The Paradoxes of Paul (WUNT 2/181; eds. D. A. Carson, 
Peter T. O’Brien and Mark A. Seifrid; Tübingen, Germany: Mohr 
Siebeck/Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 2004), 39–74. 
50 Of course, Piper does not intend to present this image of God, but leaves 
himself open to this charge by taking his orientation from the contemplation of 
the divine being in itself, i.e. from God’s hidden majesty (which cannot properly 
be the object of our contemplation). See J. Piper, The Future of Justification: A 
Response to N. T. Wright (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2007), 57–71. On 
Luther’s related rejection of Aristotle’s Supreme Being, see Oswald Bayer, 
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. . . for the flourishing and well-being of everything else” (p. 70; Wright’s 
italics).51 God’s righteousness is manifest in God’s granting blessing and 
salvation. In this respect, Wright stands closer to the Scriptures than does 
Piper. Not only the biblical references to God’s righteousness, but also 
references to God’s glory speak of it as the revelation of God’s saving 
mercy—a mercy that (like God’s righteousness) arrives through 
judgment. Just as God’s glory once came near to Israel at the “mercy 
seat,” so now God’s glory comes near to dwell with fallen human beings 
in the crucified and risen Christ.52 Those who believe in Christ boast in 
the hope of the glory of God, once rejected but now restored in him 
(Rom 1:23; 3:23; 5:1). God wills to make known “the riches of his glory” 
on vessels of mercy whom God prepared for this very purpose (Rom 
9:23). The revelation of the glory of the Lord brings salvation (Isa 40:1-
11), and rises and shines upon his people, drawing the nations to him (Isa 
60:1-3; cf. Ps 96:2-3). The listing of passages could go on and would 
include the Isaianic references to the Servant of the Lord being made a 
“light to the nations” (Isa 42:6; 49:6; cf. Isa 42:12; 49:3). It is not 
through the Servant’s obedience or fidelity that the Servant comes to be a 
“light.” The Servant—both as Israel and as Israel’s deliverer—manifests 
the glory of the Lord as the object of the Lord’s deliverance. Unlike the 
lifeless idols, the Creator promises salvation and brings it to pass in and 
for his Servant, thus, making the Servant “a light to the nations.” The 
Servant’s active role of bringing justice to the nations (Isa 42:1-4; 49:7-
13) is subordinate to the Servant’s passive role as the recipient of justice. 
The Lord takes him by the hand, preserves him in trouble, and through 
him brings forth “new things” (Isa 42:5-9; 49:8). It is through his own 
experience of being delivered that the servant delivers others from 
violence, sufferings, and death. He first listens, then speaks and 
Freiheit als Antwort: Zur theologischen Ethik (Tübingen, Germany: Mohr 
Siebeck, 1995), 36, n. 36: “While Aristotle, in order to preserve that Supreme 
Being of his from unhappiness, never lets him look at anything but himself, 
because he thinks it would be most unpleasant for him to see so much suffering 
and so many injustices. The prophets, however, who did believe in God, had 
more temptation to regard him as unjust—Jeremiah, for instance, and Job, 
David, Asaph, and others.” (Luther, WA 18:784, 36–785, 10; see also WA TR 
1:73, 31–32). 
51 Wright’s confession of God’s self-giving goodness runs into conflict with 
his earlier insistence that the world and those in it revolve around God (see 
Wright, Justification, 23). 
52 As rightly noted by Cristof Gestrich, The Return of Splendor in the 
World: The Christian Doctrine of Sin and Forgiveness (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 1997), 296, n. 61. 
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embodies the Lord’s work that he announces.53 In answering and helping 
his servant—who not only is identified with Israel, but also distinct from 
it—the Lord comforts his people and delivers them from oppression—
and also from their own unbelief and idolatry.54 Formed by the Creator in 
his experience of suffering and deliverance, the servant, thus, displays 
the Creator’s glory. In the book of Isaiah, as in the Psalms, “light” 
signifies the saving work of the Creator alone, the One who alone “forms 
light and creates darkness, who makes peace and creates evil” (Isa 
45:7).55 Israel—in so far as the image of the servant includes the 
nation56—does not (as Wright claims) fail in its calling to be a “light to 
the nations.” Indeed, its calling never rested in its own obedience or 
actions, but in the redeeming work of the Lord who is Creator. It is not 
any moral quality within Israel that causes it to shine, but purely and 
entirely the glory of the Lord, which rises upon the rebellious nation 
precisely in the midst of the misery and retribution that have come upon 
it (Isa 60:1-3). The Isaianic language thus stands in stark contrast to 
Wright’s moralistic interpretation of “light” as imitative participation in 
God’s faithfulness and goodness. 
Over against Wright, then, one must say that it is by means of the 
spoken Gospel that we see the transforming vision of the glory of the 
Lord—the glory of Christ, God’s image—and we see that this glory is 
communicated to us. God the Creator speaks and creates light in the 
darkness. The one who raised Jesus shall also raise us with Jesus and 
present us before him together with the apostle who bears this spoken
message—in his very life (2 Cor 3:18; 4:6; 2 Cor 4:4-6, 13-15).57 In this 
53 Isa 42:5-9; 49:1-6, 7-13; 50:4-9; 52:13-12. 
54 E.g. Isa 42:18-43:7; 43:22-43:8; 46:3-13; 48:1-11 50:4-9; 52:3-6. 
55 See Isa 50:10; 51:4; 52:10 (cf. Isa 40:5); 53:11 (1QIsaa, 1QIsab, and 
LXX); 56:1; 58:8-9; 60:1-3, 19-20 (cf. Rev 22:5); 62:1. Deliverance, 
correspondingly, appears as the granting of sight to the blind (Isa 42:7, 18-25; 
43:8-13; 44:9, 18; 59:9-10). “Light” thus stands alongside the related Isaianic 
images of salvation, including the making of a way (Isa 40:3-5; 42:16; 43:19; 
51:9-11), the giving of drink (43:20; 44:3; 45:8; 48:21; 49:10), and, especially, 
the opening of the ears of the deaf (Isa 42:19; 43:8; 50:4-5). 
56 It is more likely that Israel is in view in Isa 42:6, than Isa 49:6, of course, 
where the servant’s work is to restore the nation. 
57 Consequently, it is in the incarnate, crucified and risen Christ and in the 
Gospel that we behold the glory of the Lord (2 Cor 4:3-6), not in one another, 
and certainly not in our moral transformation. (Cf. Wright, The Climax of the 
Covenant, 188–9). The apostle is indeed the bearer of the Gospel—and of the 
dying of Jesus. Yet it is not in his person, a mere earthen vessel that he is, but in 
his speaking in the midst of distress that light shines forth sub contrario (2 Cor 
4:7-15).  In the communication of God’s glory creature and Creator necessarily 
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way, the Creator gives his glory without reserve to the human creature 
while it remains the glory of the Creator alone.58 Together with the 
Servant, those who believe are made to be “a light to the nations,” not as 
those who emulate a moral ideal of faithfulness or divine goodness, but 
as those delivered by the Lord. This deliverance makes them new 
creatures and children of God, who are in fact called to imitate the God, 
who is already their Father. This new obedience does not displace the 
work of the Creator that makes us God’s children anew, but arises from 
it. It is not without significance that in the context of 2 Cor 5:21 Paul 
continues his exhortation of the Corinthians with an appeal to Isa 49:8, 
that is, with words directed to the servant of the Lord: “At an acceptable 
time I heard you [sg.], and in the day of salvation I helped you [sg.]” (2 
Cor 6:2). It is quite clear that Paul here speaks of the crucified and risen 
Christ as the Isaianic servant, through whom God brings about a new 
creation (cf. 2 Cor 5:17). Christ’s experience of suffering and comfort is 
now that of the apostle who communicates this comfort—given to him 
with the sufferings of Christ—to the Corinthians (2 Cor 1:3-7; 4:7-15). It 
is, then, not only the apostle, but also the Corinthians, who in Christ are 
“made to be the righteousness of God.” The transgressions of the world 
and its enmity toward God are overcome in his Servant, as the Lord 
promises Israel in the book of Isaiah. The communication of God’s 
righteousness, thus, corresponds to the communication of God’s glory 
and takes the same form: righteousness remains God’s alone, and yet is 
given to us in Jesus Christ.
remain distinct. 
58 Indeed, the Creator’s glory is manifest and known only as it is given “to 
the creature, through the creature”: so Johann Georg Hamann (Aesthetica in 
nuce [in Samtliche Werke; 6 vols.; ed. Josef Nadler; Vienna, Austria: Herder, 
1949–57], 2:198.28–30). On this topic, see Oswald Bayer, Schöpfung als 
Anrede: Zu einer Hermeneutik der Schöpfung (Tübingen, Germany: Mohr 
Siebeck, 1990) 9–32; Gestrich, The Return of Splendor in the World, 1–28.
